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The Effect of Women’s Intrahousehold Bargaining Power on Child Health
Outcomes in Bangladesh
Abstract
Trends in developing economies suggest that as relative female intrahousehold bargaining power
improves, consumption preferences favor basic needs which promote child welfare. This study seeks to
examine whether greater household bargaining power by Bangladeshi women is related to an
improvement the health of their children. Results suggest that certain aspects of bargaining power,
including female participation in decision-making about child health care, large household purchases and
daily needs, are associated with larger child height-for-age z-scores. There exists a positive correlation
between children in families where their mothers have decision-making authority and child health
outcomes.
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1. INTRODUCTION / MOTIVATION
Although the last three decades have witnessed a 20 percent reduction in
the proportion of malnourished children in developing countries, about 160
million children under five years of age—almost one-third of the developing
world’s children—are still malnourished (WHO 1999; Smith and Haddad 2000).
One region of the world particularly afflicted with tremendously high malnutrition
rates is South Asia. The first few years of a child’s life are the most crucial to his
or her intellectual and physical development, and health indicators function as
strong predictors of long-term nutritional status and productivity (Smith and
Haddad 2000). Without proper nutrition in childhood, a person’s potential to rise
from poverty is weakened due to lost time and lost labor, which result in lost
income.1
The nature of gender relations—relations of power between women and
men—is not easy to grasp in its full complexity. The bargaining power of men
and women instrumentally shape the resource allocation decisions households
make, and husbands and wives use their bargaining power to convey priorities in
allocation.
This paper studies women’s intrahousehold bargaining power as a tool to
improve child health outcomes. Relative female decision-making authority in
households has a demonstrated impact on expenditure allocation and on child
welfare. Increasing the share of household income controlled by women, either
through their own earnings or cash transfers, changes spending in ways that
benefit children (World Bank 2011). There exists an established link in the
literature between women’s participation in household expenditure decisions and
an allocation of resources which benefit children (Duflo 2000; Thomas 1990).
Perhaps this association between improved intrahousehold bargaining power and
allocation of resources also extends to real health outcomes for children.
This paper provides insights into the relationship between women’s
bargaining power and the health outcomes of their children. In this paper,
bargaining power, the variable of interest, is measured based on the mother’s role
in making certain household decisions as reported by the child’s mother. Factors
include decisions about child health care, decisions about purchases for daily
household needs, and decisions regarding major household purchases.2 The
dependent variable is child height-for-age, which is considered a long-run
measure of nutritional status and an adequate proxy to measure a child’s chronic
1

See section 5 Results/Discussion for a more comprehensive analysis of the impact of height on
labor market outcomes.
2
For a more detailed discussion of the variable of interest, see section 4.2 Bargaining Power.
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nutritional status. The data come from Bangladesh, one of the poorest, most
densely populated countries in the world. This study has meaningful implications
for policy and will contribute to the growing literature which finds evidence
supporting increased female bargaining power as a method to promote equality
and improve child health outcomes. Bangladesh is a Muslim-majority, patriarchal
country where women occupy subordinate roles. If women’s taking more
authority in the decision-making process at the household level in fact contributes
to a healthier population, then this is worthwhile to study. The policy implications
suggest targeting women to indirectly address the high incidence of youth
malnutrition rates in Bangladesh.
Expanding off the established connection between improved female
bargaining power and resource allocation, this paper asks if the impact on
resource allocation translates to actual child health outcomes. Also, the focus of
this paper is on very young children where the mother is the main caregiver. The
health of a young child is largely determined by his or her mother’s actions. Is
there a link to her relative decision-making power at the household level and child
health outcomes?
The results suggest that certain aspects of bargaining power, including
female participation in decision-making about child health care, large household
purchases and daily needs, are sometimes associated with larger child height-forage z-scores. There exists a positive correlation between children in families
where their mothers have decision-making authority and child health outcomes.
Additionally, the study reaffirms other important variables which are associated
with improvements in child health outcomes.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
Traditionally, economists and policy makers have tended to view the
household as a unit which pools income and allocates resources for consumption,
production, and investments as if it had a single set of preferences. This is called
the unitary model. There is no discussion of relative male and female bargaining
power if the household is viewed as a single decision-maker. Only if preferences
differ systematically between women and men can we observe differences in the
effects of men's and women's bargaining power on household economic
outcomes. However, the literature has well established that the unitary model of
the household is generally rejected (Thomas 1990; Hoddinott and Haddad 1995).
Empirical evidence suggests that individuals within households have
3

For a more detailed discussion of the dependent variable, see section 4.1 Height-for-Age.
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heterogeneous preferences. The collective model allows for intrahousehold
differences in preferences and enables bargaining power to play a role in spending
decisions. This study builds on the collective model’s foundation by not treating
the household as a single economic actor and accounting for individual
preferences.4
Within the bargaining approach, intrahousehold interaction is
characterized as containing elements of both cooperation and conflict. Household
members cooperate insofar as cooperative arrangements make each of them better
off than noncooperation. However, there exist outcomes which favor one party at
the other’s expense, exposing the underlying conflict between those cooperating.
Which outcome will emerge depends on the relative bargaining power of the
household members (Agarwal 1997).
The most common testable hypotheses associated with this model are to
predict that exogenous sources of income such as non-labor income should be
spent in the same manner in expenditure decision-making as an extension of the
collective model. Thomas (1990) finds that income controlled by the mother has
a bigger effect on her family’s health than income in the hands of the father. His
model is structured so that unearned income is separately measured. The null
hypothesis states that when income is pooled, the ratio of maternal to paternal
income effects should be equal. When household income is pooled and allocated
to maximize welfare, theoretically income under the jurisdiction of mothers and
fathers should have the same impact on demand. He finds that it does not; the
impact of unearned income on child survival was twenty times greater if the
income was brought in by the mother than if it was brought in by the father.
Using family nutrition data from Brazil, Thomas (1990) rejects the hypothesis of
equality of parent income effects. This study reinforces the collective model’s
assumption that men and women have different preferences (Thomas 1990).
Quisumbing and Maluccio (2000) explore the unitary versus collective
models of the household, suggesting that the unitary household model is not a
good approximation to household behavior. Using assets at marriage as indicators
of intrahousehold bargaining power, they find that more assets brought to the
marriage by women relative to men increases education expenditure shares in
Bangladesh and South Africa (Quisumbing and Maluccio 2000).
These models embodying the bargaining approach provide a useful
framework for analyzing gender relations, shedding light on how gender
4

For more general models of household decision-making, see McElroy and Horney (1980);
Browning and Chiappori (1998). In these collective models, the relative power of household
members plays a central role in shaping household decisions.
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asymmetries within a household are structured and modified. The nature of
gender relations—relations of power between women and men—is not easy to
grasp in its full complexity. For instance, most models characterize these
dynamics as a form of "bargaining," but fail to articulate the complex range of
factors, especially qualitative ones, that might determine bargaining power
(Agarwal 1997). Agarwal cautions that models and policies could go amiss if
intrahousehold dynamics are assumed (as they often are) to exist in isolation,
without examining the extrahousehold socioeconomic and legal institutions within
which households are embedded. Women's bargaining power within the home is
clearly associated with their situation outside it. Perhaps developmental policies
toward improving women’s earning capacity and expanding women’s opportunity
have to potential to reduce unequal treatment in the household (Agarwal 1997).
Since women are primary caregivers of children in many cultures, many
studies of development policies have found supportive evidence of female higher
decision power translating into better child outcomes. Literature on the Old Age
Pension (OAP) program in South Africa has shown that children living in
extended families benefit from the pensions received by their grandmothers.
Duflo (2000) evaluates the effect of pension transfer on children’s nutritional
status and finds that the height-for-age z-scores of younger girls are increased by
1.16 standard deviation units and the weight-for-height z-scores by 1.19 standard
deviation units. However, the effect is not significant for boys. Duflo (2000) finds
that the Old Age Pension program had a substantial effect on the nutrition of
young girls, and the effect was stronger when the pension was received by a
woman. Duflo (2000) suggests that if improving children's nutrition is a policy
objective, targeting public transfers to women rather than to men might be
preferable (Duflo 2000).
Another example of a program which highlights the importance of income
in the hands of women is the Mexican PROGRESA program. In this program,
payments are made to women conditional on their children attending school and
on their participation in a health care monitoring and food supplementation
program. The program has been shown to have significant effects on children's
health, nutrition, and education (Behrman and Skoufias 2006). The findings in the
literature suggest that policies targeted towards women can generate immediate
consequences by either improving a women’s voice in the household or
contributing to an improvement in human capital investments in children. There is
strong evidence that women tend to shift a larger shares of spending on goods
which promote child welfare if they are able to control a bigger share of
household resources (Behrman and Skoufias 2006).
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A few discussion papers sponsored by the International Food Policy
Research Institute (IFPRI) discuss resource allocation in Bangladesh. Quisumbing
and Briere (2000) examine how differences in the bargaining power of husband
and wife affect the distribution of expenditures in Bangladesh, finding further
support for the hypothesis that increased resources controlled by women are often
allocated towards children.
Another IFPRI project brief furthers the study of parental resource control.
The study suggests that women with more assets, income, or education have
greater bargaining power in the household because they have more options
outside of the household.
The bargaining power of men and women
instrumentally shape the resource allocation decisions households make.
Husbands and wives use their bargaining power to convey priorities in allocation,
and the study suggests that improving a woman’s bargaining power and access to
resources will increase household expenditure on children (IFPRI Project Brief 1,
2000 and IFPRI Project Brief 3, 2000). These papers find that both male and
female asset ownership at marriage is strongly determined by the human capital of
husband and wife and by the characteristics of their origin families.
Additionally, an understanding of important causes of malnutrition is
imperative for the relevance of my model. South Asia is a region plagued by
chronic youth malnutrition. Osmani (1997) suggests that variables such as
women’s status may be key in understanding the prevalence of malnutrition in
South Asia. He attempts to explain why South Asia's child malnutrition rate is so
much higher than Sub-Saharan Africa's, despite almost equal poverty rates, higher
food availability in South Asia, and comparable levels of public provision of
health and sanitation services. The author concludes that particular factors, such
as the low status of women in South Asia, are important determinants of
malnutrition and stunted height (Osmani 1997).
Women’s educational attainment has been connected to child health
outcomes both directly and as a way to gauge the woman’s autonomy in the
household. The education level of women, the main caretakers of children in
Bangladesh, has several potential positive effects on the health of their children.
Abu-Ghaida and Klasen (2004) find that more educated women are more capable
of processing information, using health care facilities, and keeping their living
environment clean. However, women’s relatively lower status in Bangladesh
restricts their capacity to act in their own and their children’s best interests. The
authors indicate women's status relative to men (rather than their absolute status)
as an important factor, especially for resource control in households. Women are
more likely to allocate marginal resources to the interests of their children than
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are men; however, the lower their autonomy and control over resources, the less
able they are to do so (Haddad, Hoddinott, and Alderman 1997).
3. DATA
The data used in this report is from the 2007 Bangladesh Demographic
and Health Survey (BDHS), a nationally representative sample survey designed to
provide an empirical analysis on basic national indicators of social progress. The
survey focuses on health-related information, including fertility, childhood
mortality, contraceptive knowledge and use, maternal and child health, nutritional
status of mothers and children, awareness of AIDS, and domestic violence. Since
1984, the Demographic and Health Survey program has conducted more than 100
nationally representative household surveys in more than 50 countries. This
survey is the fifth in a series of national-level population and health surveys
conducted in Bangladesh as part of the global Demographic and Health Surveys
(DHS) program. Data collection took place over a five-month period from March
24, 2007 to August, 11 2007. Both urban and rural areas were surveyed.
Despite the many advantages of the Demographic and Health Survey, one
of its limitations is the absence of an income or expenditure variable, which is
generally regarded as an important measure of welfare and empowerment. It does,
however, include a wealth index, a variable which measures relative living
standards. This allows for some analysis of the effects of wealth on various health
and nutrition indicators (Hoddinott and Haddad 1995).
This is a non-experimental study which uses retrospective data about
decisions mothers make in the household. This paper focuses on 5,169 children
under five years of age for whom plausible anthropometric data were available.
Since this paper is conceptualizing women’s bargaining power in relation to her
bargaining with her spouse, only those children with both parents’ information
available in the survey are included. 65% of the households are rural. The average
number of family members per household is 6.41, while the average number of
children under 5 per household is 1.34. 49.6% of the children are female, while
50.4% are male. Over 90% of the households are Muslim.5 See Table 1.1-1.5 for
a more detailed look at the summary statistics.
4. MODEL SPECIFICATION
5

Religion is not included as a control in the model as the low variation in respondents’ selfreported religious affiliation (>90% Muslim) did not meaningfully impact the coefficients on the
bargaining power variables.
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This paper contains four models to specify the relationship between
mother’s status in the household and child health outcomes. Each model expands
the scope of consideration for what contributes to child health. Each of these
models takes the following form:
ChildHealthij = β0 + β1 (BargainingPowerij) +

1

(Xij) + eij

Where Childhealthij is the height-for-age z-score for child i in household j.
BargainingPowerij is the key variable of interest for the mother of child i in
household j, represented by three measurements of whether the mother jointly or
unilaterally participates in making certain household decisions.6 Matrix Xij
includes all controls and eij captures the idiosyncratic errors. The main focus of
this paper is on the estimate of β1 and the expectation is that β1 >0. The
coefficient on BargainingPower, β1, does not represent the causal impact of
mother’s bargaining power on child health outcomes. This paper solely intends to
estimate the significant determinants of child health by assessing interesting
correlations. While we cannot speak to causality in this story, the regression
results shed light on variables which are associated with positive or negative
improvements in child health in Bangladesh.
Model 1 is the most parsimonious model, including only the most basic
variables pertaining to the child and mother in addition to the key variables of
interest. In Model 1, Xij includes only child and mother characteristics, including
if the child is female, the child’s birth order, the mother’s age in years, the
mother’s educational attainment in years, and the mother’s BMI in Kg/m2.
Model 2 expands the specifications by including two variables which
capture some measure of the mother’s participation in economic activity. These
variables include whether the mother belongs to a microfinance program and
whether the mother has worked in the past twelve months.
To Model 2 we add variables to capture factors at the household level
which vary across households. This is Model 3. In Model 3, Xij includes the
variables in Model 2 plus controls for household characteristics, such as if the
head of household is female, if the household is rural, and the wealth index
variable as a measure of household income. These variables control for household
level characteristics to account for possible sources of heterogeneity.

6

For more information on the variables of interest, see section 4.2 Bargaining Power.
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Finally we add the husband’s characteristics, as perhaps information about
the husband may drive investments in child health.7 The matrix Xij in Model 4
includes all of the controls in Model 3 and additionally, variables which assess
attributes of the husband. These variables include husband’s age in years and
husband’s educational attainment in years. Because this sample was determined
by children whose heights were measured and for whom information on both
parents was available, the sample size remains the same (5,169 observations) in
the four models. The models include these controls to avoid omitted variables
bias; they also serve to aid the examination of what contributes to improvements
in child health outcomes.
4.1 Height-For-Age
A common measure of malnutrition is the anthropometric status of underfive-year-old children. Height for age is considered a long-run measure of
nutritional status and an adequate proxy to measure a child’s chronic nutritional
status. Height-for-age was selected as the dependent variable for this research
because of its potential responsiveness to bargaining power in the household. In
developing countries, human growth deficiencies are caused primarily by two
preventable factors- inadequate food and infections. Genetic factors become
important in adolescence, so the height of a young child, given his or her age,
depends on the accumulated investment in nutrition and healthcare over the
child’s life (Duflo 2000). Inadequate nutrition in childhood has significant and
permanent implications for long-term physical development as well as the
development of cognitive skills. This in turn impacts productivity, which affects
labor market opportunities and national output (Duflo 2000).
Low height-for-age, which is called “stunting,” refers to a situation in
which children are shorter than expected for their age and gender group in the
reference population due to past chronic nutritional deficiency. Stunting and its
effects typically become permanent. Most stunting occurs between 6 and 24
months of age, and stunting after 24 months of age generally reflects the
interaction of nutrition and infection at earlier ages (Martorell and Habicht 1986).
Stunted children may never regain the height lost as a result of stunting, and most
children will never gain the corresponding body weight (Omilola 2010).
7

The data is not explicit about whether the wife’s current husband is the child’s father. However,
virtually all women in the sample have been married for more than 5 years to her current spouse.
We cannot say with certainty that these men are the children’s fathers, but the information on the
husband corresponds to the male figure who is married to the child’s mother and who has been in
the household for at least 5 years. There are about 200 women (5%) who have been married more
than once and of those 200, there are 8 women who have been married for fewer than 5 years.
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Height-for-age is typically expressed as a z-score. Labeling a child as
having impaired growth implies some means of comparison with a reference child
of the same age and gender. The DHS database uses as a basis for comparison
across countries the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) growth
reference. The NCHS reference population consists of a group of well-nourished
American children and functions as a benchmark. Using standardized z-scores
enables ease of comparability across different studies (World Health Organization
1983). Through the use of a standard reference population as a point of
comparison, z-scores are a statistical measure of the distance from the median
expressed as a proportion of the standard deviation.
Z-score =

(Observed value) - (Median value of the reference value)
(Standard deviation of the reference population)

Relatively short children log negative z-scores while tall children record
positive z-scores. The commonly used cut-off point to identify severely
malnourished children is a measurement of 2 SD below the median of the
reference group (Alderman, Hoogeveen, and Rossi 2005). The mean height-forage Z-score for this dataset is -1.54 (SD=1.28), significantly lower than zero, the
expected value for the reference distribution. This implies that the entire
distribution has shifted downward, suggesting that a lot of the children have
inadequate heights for their age. About 20% of the sample includes children with
stunted growth, which means -2 standard deviations from the mean. See Figure 1
for the distribution of the dependent variable.
4.2 Bargaining Power
Bargaining power is difficult to directly quantify. Recent literature on
intrahousehold resource allocation has focused on several factors that influence
bargaining power and how households allocate resources. For example, Agarwal
(1997) writes that relative bargaining power within the household perhaps could
be revealed in who participates in decision-making and about what. Hence,
women who participate in decision-making may be said to have greater
bargaining strength than those excluded from such decision-making altogether.
The variables of interest in this model are based on the mother’s role in
making certain household decisions as reported by the child’s mother. The
questions contained in the survey that are being used to measured women’s
bargaining power are:
-

Who usually makes decisions about child health care?
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-

Who usually makes decisions about making purchases for daily household
needs?
Who usually makes decisions about making major household purchases?

No information is provided about what constitutes a major purchase or a daily
need. As for the types of decision-makers, the survey includes five categories:
husband decides, wife decides, husband and wife jointly decide, someone else
decides, and wife and someone else decide. I created three dichotomous variables
to be used in the estimation equation. The constructed variables in the model take
a value of one when the woman unilaterally or jointly contributes to the decisionmaking process. Together, these variables compose a general measure of the
mother’s agency in the household.8
Most households make their purchasing and health care decisions jointly.
74% of the mothers contribute to decisions about child health care, 61% of the
women have some say in large purchases, and 67% participate in decisions
regarding purchases of daily needs. 19% of women make child health care
decisions unilaterally, 8% unilaterally make decisions about major household
purchases, and 29% of women unilaterally make decisions about purchases for
daily household needs. 26% of women in the sample are not involved in decisions
regarding child health care, 39% the women have no decision-making power
regarding large purchases, and 33% do not influence decisions about daily needs.
This suggests that husbands are still dominating the decision making process in
the household and wives have less power in general.
Unilateral
Decisions (%)

Joint
Some Say (%)
Decisions (%)

No Say (%)

N

Child Health Care

19

55

74..

26

4224

Large Purchases

8

53

61..

39

4224

Daily Needs

29

38

67..

33

4224

There are a few possible sources of endogeneity in the relationship
between mother’s power and child outcomes. A mother with high socio-economic
8

For this paper, the bargaining power variables reflect at least some female contribution in
household decision-making. Intuitively, a unilateral decision perhaps holds more weight than a
joint decision; however, equal weighting has been given to both unilateral and joint decisions to
avoid assigning arbitrary importance. Including a joint decision as some measure of participation
is perhaps a weaker measure, yet it allows for a broader definition of bargaining power. Results
for unilateral bargaining power are not included.
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status tends to be more powerful in family bargaining, and she may be more likely
to invest in child human capital. Although some observable characteristics can be
controlled for in the regression, estimates are still biased with unobservable
characteristics. For instance, a well-endowed woman can bring more resources to
the marriage through her high level of social capital and an outside social
network, which may simultaneously enhance her power and her capacity to invest
more in her children (Quisumbing and de la Briere 2000).
Social norms and custom-based gender discrimination in Bangladesh are
another potential cause of endogeneity. In societies with patrilineal kinship and
inheritance, women are limited to the domestic sphere with less bargaining
power. Additionally, these areas tend to have stronger son preference and allocate
more resources to sons. This may impact relative investments in child health, and
this cultural preference may impact the models’ estimates. Ideally, the model
would look to identify sources of women’s bargaining power which vary
exogenously, such as assets at marriage or non-labor income; however, no such
variable is available nor included in the model. This hypothetical variable which
captures the mother’s unobservable endowments that she brings into the marriage
could perhaps more fully capture her bargaining power.
4.3 Maternal Education
Models of child health production emphasize the importance of the
mother’s education as well as her bargaining power. Greater education increases
her health knowledge which improves her ability to promote the health of her
children (World Bank 1993), and greater bargaining power increases her say over
household resources which often leads to greater allocations to child health and
nutrition, compared to their husbands. Because maternal education affects
children's survival probability, the sample of living children over-represents
children of educated mothers. Consequently, the effect of maternal education is
likely to be slightly underestimated (Desai and Alva 1998). The results presented
in this paper are not weighted to account for this underestimation. Educational
attainment in the model is measured in years. The average educational attainment
for mothers in the sample is 5.12 years (SD= 4.39). 25% have no education, 21%
have incomplete primary education, 10% completed primary school, 28% have
incomplete secondary education, 7% completed secondary school, and 9% have a
higher educational background.9

9

In this study, maternal education functions as a control variable. Using dummy variables to
represent various educational achievements (e.g., complete primary school, complete secondary
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4.4 Wealth Index
Another important control in the model is the wealth index. The
association between socioeconomic status and health status has been highly
studied (Thomas 1994; Razzaque 2011). Rutstein and Johnson (2004) find that
chronic child malnutrition as measured by the percent stunted among children
under five years is also highly variable by wealth, with the level of stunting for
the lowest quintile being almost nine times the level for the highest quintile in
Peru.
For many economists, household income is the theoretical indicator of
choice. However, it is extremely difficult to measure accurately in developing
countries for a number of reasons—mainly because people do not know their
income or only know it in broad ranges, earnings vary daily, weekly, or
seasonally, and an earner may have several sources of income at one time.10 In the
DHS survey data, the wealth index is a composite measure of a household's
cumulative living standard. As a measure of economic status, wealth has several
advantages. It represents a more permanent status than does either income or
consumption. Also, in the DHS questionnaires, wealth is more easily measured
(with only a single respondent needed in most cases) and requires far fewer
questions than either consumption expenditures or income.
The wealth index is calculated using data on a household’s ownership of
selected assets, such as televisions and bicycles, materials used for housing, types
of water access and sanitation facilities, and other characteristics that are related
to wealth status. The wealth index places individual households on a continuous
scale of relative wealth. DHS categorizes all interviewed households into five
wealth quintiles to compare the influence of wealth on various health and
nutrition indicators.11 The wealth index allows for the isolation of problems
particular to the poor, such as unequal access to health care, as well as those
which pertain to the wealthy. The wealth index is particularly essential for this
research, as the DHS data lacks detailed information about earnings and income.
The wealth index enables the model to control for the extent to which household
economic status affects child health outcomes. There are 4,145 households in the
sample. About 19% are categorized as poorest, 20% fall into the poorer category,

school) was considered, but the coefficients on bargaining power were not affected so years of
education as a continuous variable is utilized here.
10
For more information, see Rutstein and Johnson (2004).
11
http://www.measuredhs.com/topics/Wealth-Index.cfm
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19% are classified as middle, 19% are grouped as richer, and 23% are labeled as
richest. By construction, each quintile has about 20% of the households.
4.5 Working
Women’s participation in economic activities has been studied as a
pathway to increased empowerment and raised status in the household as an
earner. In Bangladesh, however, as in many patriarchal societies, there is
substantial under-reporting of women’s economic activity (Mahmud and Tasneem
2011). Non-recognition of women’s economic activity not only leads to
undervaluation of women’s economic contribution but also contributes to their
lower status in society relative to men. The types of work women are involved in
are often overlooked by women themselves (Mahmud and Tasneem 2011). Sen
(1990) argues that women who earn cash have more bargaining power than those
who are solely housewives, because of, among other things, the cultural
devaluation of housework. Women's entry into wage labor could thus be one way
of increasing their intrahousehold bargaining power not just directly, but
indirectly, by increasing the perceived legitimacy of their claims. 1,128 women in
the sample (27%) have worked in the past 12 months, and 84.5% of working
women are paid in cash or in cash and in kind. Becker (1981) suggests that
women’s employment or raise in economic share in the family may increase
allocation to household resources to them but may not necessarily upgrade their
decision-making power.
4.6 Body Mass Index
This paper uses body mass index (BMI) to capture the mother’s health
status. BMI, which is also known as Quetelet’s Index, is defined as weight in
kilograms divided by the square of height in meters. Unlike the nutritional status
of children, the evaluation of nutritional status of women does not require a
reference table from a well-nourished population. The BMI of well-nourished
adult women ranges from 18.5 to 25.0. A BMI higher than 25.0 indicates obesity
or what is sometimes called over-nutrition. A BMI lower than 18.5 is considered
to be an indicator of energy deficiency or low food intake, which can be used to
assess malnutrition (Omilola 2010). There are important reasons why mother’s
BMI has been included as a control variable. The nutritional status of women can
have serious consequences for their children’s birth weights and for infant
mortality (Omilola 2010). The literature has well-documented that the BMI of an
adult can serve as a good proxy for current nutritional status (Sen 1990; Strauss
and Thomas 1998). The average mother’s BMI in this sample is 20.43 (SD=
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3.35). The mother’s BMI in the data is measured at the time of the survey, not at
the time of her children’s birth. While an imperfect measure, it crudely captures
the mother’s health status and controls for the effects of the mother’s health on
child health (under the assumption that BMI should not drastically change over
the 5 year period).
4.7 Microfinance
Women’s participation in microfinance programs has been viewed as an
important channel for increasing women’s subordinate status within the
household. The literature suggests that participation in microfinance programs
improves women’s empowerment and intrahousehold bargaining power. Similar
to the working variable which captures the mother’s formal work experience,
microfinance participation aims to capture another facet of women’s participation
in the market. The microfinance variable is a dichotomous variable which takes
the value one if the mother belongs to at least one microfinance program. The
programs include Grameen, BRAC, Asha, Proshika, and BRBD. 28% of the
women in the sample belong to at least one microfinance program.
5. RESULTS / DISCUSSION
Table 2 presents the OLS regression estimates which analyze the effect of
women’s decision-making status on their children’s health. There exists a positive
correlation between children in families where their mothers have decisionmaking authority and height-for-age ratios. The coefficient on the bargaining
power variable which captures whether the mother participates in decisions about
large purchases is consistently significant at the 1% level and positively correlated
with child health outcomes. As the variables of interest are dichotomous, their
interpretation is a description of contrasts of one category relative to another. In
Model 1, the coefficient implies that children with mothers who participate in
making large household purchases are on average 0.118 standard deviation units
taller than children whose mothers do not participate, ceteris paribus. As more
control variables are added, the coefficient on the variable describing participating
in decisions about large purchases does not vary substantially in magnitude. There
is little to no evidence, however, for a relationship between child health and other
female bargaining power variables. In Model 1, whether a mother makes
decisions about daily needs is significant at the 10% level. This variable loses its
explanatory power as more specifications are added to the model. The effect of
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whether the mother makes decisions regarding child health care is small and not
significant.
Overall, the findings from these models are consistent with the literature.
Mother's education, a continuous variable measured in years, is positively related
to height-for-age ratios. For every additional year of mother's education, we can
expect child height to increase on average by 0.091 standard deviations, holding
all other regressors constant. Also, mother’s BMI is consistently statistically
significant across the models and also positively associated with child health. In
Model 1, on average, female children are 0.085 standard deviations shorter than
their male counterparts. This is significant at the 5% level. As more variables are
included, the coefficient capturing the relative disadvantage of female children
slightly decreases in magnitude. In Model 4, for example, the coefficient tells us
that on average, female children are 0.077 standard deviations shorter than their
male counterparts, holding all else constant. Being a rural child also is associated
with lower height-for-age z-scores, although this effect is not statistically
significant.
The coefficients on the wealth index are all negatively correlated with the
dependent variable with respect to the highest wealth quintile. The wealthiest
quintile is the reference group, as using this category best exploits and most
clearly demonstrates the negative relationship between wealth status and health
outcomes. The coefficient magnitudes decrease as living standards rise, which is
consistent with the literature. They are all highly statistically significant,
suggesting the strong relationship between income and child health outcomes.
When variables measuring attributes of the child’s father are added in Model 4,
the impact of wealth on child health decreases. We still see the wealth index as
highly statistically and economically significant, yet the magnitudes of the
coefficients of each quintile relative to the richest quintile decrease in absolute
value. For example, in Model 3, the coefficient on the wealth index of children
from the poorest households tells us that on average, these children are 0.41
standard deviations shorter than their counterparts in the wealthiest quintile,
holding everything else constant. In Model 4, the coefficient on children from
households designated poorest reads that on average, children from the poorest
households are 0.13 standard deviations shorter than their counterparts from the
richest families, holding everything else constant.
Wealth (the proxy for income) matters less once we take husband’s
education into account. Perhaps this is because husband’s education is in some
way measuring his labor market outcomes, and therefore captures some of the

Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2012

15

Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 9 [2012], Iss. 1, Art. 4

explanatory power of the wealth index. The significance of the mother’s
education on child health outcomes falls in magnitude once add husband’s
characteristics to the model, especially the variable which captures the husband’s
years of education. This suggests the importance of parental education.
Definitely the women’s education matters as it remains significant at the 1%
level, but when the model controls for husband’s education, the coefficient on the
women’s education reduces in magnitude.
Interestingly, the microfinance variable is negatively associated with the
dependent variable and is consistently statistically significant at the 1% level
across the four models. The negative correlation between microfinance
participation and child health outcomes is surprising. The literature and empirical
evidence suggests that participation in microfinance schemes increases women’s
intrahousehold agency by providing a source of income and increasing exposure
to outside social networks. Women’s participation in microfinance programs has
been viewed as an important channel for increasing women’s subordinate status
within the household. In Model 3, before controlling for household wealth, this
negative correlation may be explained by the fact that the poorest households
have the highest likelihood of eligibility for participation in microfinance
programs. In the bottom quintile, 36% of the children have mothers in a
microfinance program. In the 2nd quintile, 33% of children do. In the 3rd quintile,
31% do, in the 4th, 26% do, and in the top wealth quintile, only 14% of children
have mothers in a microfinance program. The trend suggests that participation in
microfinance programs is negatively correlated with accumulated assets. While
this initially seems counter-intuitive, in light of the strong wealth story to explain
child health outcomes, the sign on microfinance becomes a little more
understandable. However, the variable continues to be negatively significant after
controlling for wealth.
Perhaps trends in the literature are not so straight-forward. Microfinance
promotes income-generating activities and microenterprises. The beneficiaries use
the loan to supplement an ongoing source of income. Perhaps this practice has
adverse effects on child health as microfinance participation diverts the mother’s
time from household activities. The children in the sample are very young, so
perhaps microfinance exposes the underlying tension between the mother’s
reproductive and productive roles. Women’s participation in microfinance
programs may increase her status in the household; however, there is little
correlation with her relative bargaining power and microfinance membership.
Low levels of investment in child health therefore have far-reaching
consequences for economic growth, distribution, and welfare. Case and Paxson
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(2008) examine the impact of height on labor market outcomes. They find that
height is positively associated with cognitive ability, which is rewarded in the
labor market by higher average earnings. Using data from the USA and UK, Case
and Paxson find that the association between height and earnings is economically
significant. For both men and women, the relationship is striking: a one-inch
increase in height is associated on average with a 1.4 percent to 2.9 percent
increase in weekly earnings, and a 1.0 percent to 2.3 percent increase in average
hourly earnings. Their results also indicate that an increase in US men’s heights
from the 25th to the 75th percentile of the height distribution—an increase of four
inches—is associated with an increase in earnings of 9.2 percent. Although men
earn more than women at all heights, the increase in earnings with height is
similar for men and women (Case and Paxson 2008). These trends also exist in
developing countries. Vogl (2001) looks at labor market outcomes in Mexico and
finds that height bestows advantages in cognitive skill, education, health, and
earnings. His results imply that a one centimeter increase in height leads to wage
gains of 2.1 percent and 2.9 percent for men and women, respectively (Vogl
2011). These numbers help to conceptualize the long-term returns to health. The
literature examines the importance of height as it pertains to long-run productivity
and wages, demonstrating the importance of investment in child health.
5.1 Heterogeneous Effects
The current sample includes all children aged 0-59 months old in both
urban and rural areas. An interesting question is whether the empirical findings
hold for subsamples such as urban vs. rural, girls vs. boys, infants (<12 months)
vs. non-infants. Tables 3 shows regression results for interactions of the
bargaining power variables and certain sub-populations under the hypothesis that
the relationship between bargaining power and child health outcomes varies by
certain conditions, namely age of the child, geographical location, and gender of
the child. If children in the different groups are somehow systematically different
from their counterparts, it makes sense to run these interaction models. By
incorporating dummy variables for group membership and interaction terms for
group membership with the bargaining power variables, we can better identify
what effects, if any, differ across groups. Because mother’s participation in
decisions regarding large purchases is consistently significant and robust
throughout Model 1-4, only this measure of female bargaining power is used in
the interaction results. Using one decision-making variable to generally represent
relative power allows for a clearer, more digestible analysis.
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Employing interaction terms was selected as the preferred method to
examine different effects within groups. Sample selections issues may have been
introduced running regressions with sub-populations. For example, there may be
something particular and unobservable about the type of parents who have
allowed a girl child to survive. Interaction terms control for if female children are
systematically neglected. Likewise, there may be something unique and
unobservable about parents whose infant child survives past infancy. We do not
know the composition of natives and immigrants, especially in urban areas, so
running just a rural or urban sample invites sample selection concerns also. The
interaction terms indicate the difference in mother’s bargaining power effects
between groups (infant and non-infant, female children and male children, urban
and rural) yet preserve the sample size.
Table 3 shows the results of the regression including the bargaining power
variable associated with large purchases interacted with the infant dummy, female
child dummy, and rural dummy relative to the baseline model (Model 4 of Table
2). Column two of Table 3 displays the regression of the interaction of the
variable of interest with the infant dummy. The t-value on infant is highly
significant implying that the intercepts do differ. For both infants and non-infants,
mother’s participation in decision-making is associated with an increase in heightfor-age z-scores. The results submit that, for infants and non-infants with equal
levels of material bargaining power, there is no additional advantage for infants if
mothers participate in household decisions about large purchases.
Columns three and four in Table 3 indicate that there are not substantial
differences in child health outcomes between genders with respect to maternal
bargaining power and geographical location with respect to maternal bargaining
power. The partial effect of height-for-age z-scores with respect to the interaction
dummies does not depend on the magnitude of the bargaining power variables.
None of the bargaining power variables nor the interaction terms is statistically
significant in these models. Bargaining power is not related to child health in a
different way when examining subgroups. Being female or being an infant or
being rural matters in the expected way; however, given that, mother’s decisionmaking authority has no impact vis-à-vis male or non-infants or urban children.
5.2 Fixed Effects
The fixed effects model changes the nature of the hypothesized question
by asking how bargaining power affects child health in households encompassing
joint families. A fixed effects model controls for household-level unobservables.
It is possible that omitted family-level variables, including attitudes about women
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and women’s agency, are correlated with regressors, and thus their estimated
effects on child health outcomes may be biased.
A unique feature of households in South Asia which can be exploited with
a fixed effects model is the phenomenon of multi-generational families. A
household could be composed of multiple nuclear families all led by the same
head of household figure. Within this special subset of households with joint
families, the fixed effects model allows us to ask if is there differences in child
health outcomes with respect to the mother’s bargaining power when male
attitudes about women are held constant. Of course in joint families, measuring
bargaining becomes much more complicated, as there are not just two adult
interests competing.
Table 4 shows the results of the fixed effect regression. In the sample,
there are 256 households with more than one mother present. The variation in the
fixed effects model comes from these households. All household-level variables
are dropped from the model. When the model controls for household-level
features, the magnitude of the coefficient on women making decisions about child
health care grows substantially larger and becomes statistically significant at the
10% level. Whether the mother participates in large purchase decisions loses its
significance. The disadvantage of being a female child falls once household level
effects are controlled for and becomes not significant. Interestingly, mother’s age
becomes highly negatively significant. Mother’s education and father’s education
are no longer significant, despite their consistent significance in the other models.
Also, whether the child’s mother participates in a microfinance program loses its
statistical significance.
These results demonstrate that what determines child health in multigenerational families is more complicated. Cooperation and conflict models
require more nuance. There are more resources in joint families which mothers in
nuclear families do not have access to. Fewer mothers in joint families participate
in microfinance programs. These households are wealthier and there are more
working males under one roof. The need to borrow funds or take loans decreases
as there are multiple sources of income within the household already. Also, there
are more mothers present to care for children. A mother’s time away from the
household participating in microfinance programs may not have as severe an
impact her child’s health thanks to the presence of other mothers, grandparents, or
other female figures. Why age becomes negatively significant is an interesting
question. A more in-depth study of the household structure of joint families may
prove to provide an answer. Are older or younger mothers responsible for taking
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care of the children? In multi-generational families, young mothers have to
contend with mother-in-laws and more senior female figures. It is unclear what
the mechanism is, but within a household as the mother’s age increases, the
child’s height-for-age ratio decreases. A complete analysis of the interesting
dynamics of joint households’ structure is limited by the data. There is a need for
future exploration of women’s roles within joint families and specifically joint
families in Bangladesh.
6. CONCLUSION
This paper assumes a collective model of household bargaining to address
the association between women’s decision power and child health outcomes. The
theoretical foundation predicts that when mothers have stronger preference for
child quality than fathers, an increase in mother’s bargaining power can benefit
the child. This paper tests the theory’s implications using 2007 household data
from Bangladesh. The empirical evidence is consistent with the theory: women
who enjoy decision-making power in the household, especially regarding large
purchases, are associated with having children with better height-for-age ratios.
Both theoretical prediction and empirical findings submit the importance of
raising female intrahousehold power. This is particularly relevant for the
developing countries where there is persistent gender inequality in the household.
This paper contributes to the body of literature discussing the importance
of women’s agency in households in relation to children’s health, given the
established link between women’s control of household resources and
consumption preferences favoring basic needs which promote child welfare.
Women's empowerment and the promotion of gender equality are key ingredients
to achieving sustainable development. Women’s inequality as it translates to
intrahousehold bargaining power affects child welfare, including rates of chronic
malnutrition. Enhancing women’s status leads to more investment in their
children’s education, health, and overall wellbeing. This study contributes to the
existing literature on the subject because the effect of mother’s participation in
expenditure decisions as it relates to child malnutrition prevalence in Bangladesh
is an area which has not been fully explored. If measures suggesting that
increased rates of women’s bargaining power do in fact improve children’s health
levels, then this is an important and relevant conclusion to consider when
constructing policy to target the poor.
This study provides interesting fodder and an exciting opportunity for
future study. This study’s ability to capture the robust and complex nature of
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intrahousehold bargaining power was limited by the data. In future studies about
bargaining power and child health, perhaps more sophisticated panel data could
better capture the dynamic nature of bargaining power. Additionally, an
exogenous source of bargaining power such as non-labor income or assets at
marriage could prove noteworthy. Also, it is important to examine the
extrahousehold socioeconomic and legal institutions within which households are
embedded, as women's bargaining power within the home is clearly associated
with their situation outside it.
Various economic and social development indicators show that in the last
20 years, Bangladesh, a poor, Muslim-majority, patriarchal country, has made
substantial progress towards gender equality. As Bangladesh turns 40,
improvements in women’s wellbeing and increased agency may be some of the
most significant gains in the post-independence era.
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The dependent variable, height-for-age z-scores, is normally distributed around mean -1.54.

Table 1.1 Child Summary Statistics
Children's Characteristics
Height-for-Age (z-score)
Child Age (months)
Child Height (cms)
Proportion of Female Children
Proportion of Infants

Mean
-1.54
29.50
82.37
0.50
0.20

Std. Dev.
1.28
17.02
12.86
0.50
0.40

Min.
-5.84
0
49
0
0

Max.
4.35
59
116.8
1
1

Obs.
5169
5169
5169
5169
5169

Mean
25.96
5.12
20.43

Std. Dev.
6.32
4.39
3.35

Min.
15
0
12.31

Max.
49
17
42.7

Obs.
4224
4224
4224

0.28

0.45

0

1

4224

0.27

0.44

0

1

4224

Table 1.2 Mother Summary Statistics
Mothers' Characteristics
Age (yrs)
Education (yrs)
BMI (kg/m2)
Proportion Belonging to a Microfinance
program
Proportion Working
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Table 1.3 Female Bargaining Power Summary Statistics
Bargaining Power
Proportion that Participates in Decisions
re. Child Health Care
Proportion that Participates in Decisions
re. Large Purchases
Proportion that Participates in Decisions
re. Daily Needs

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min.

Max.

Obs.

0.74

0.44

0

1

4224

0.61

0.49

0

1

4224

0.67

0.47

0

1

4224

Mean
0.65
0.09
3.05

Std. Dev.
0.48
0.28
1.44

Min.
0
0
1

Max.
1
1
5

Obs.
3968
3968
3968

Mean
35.11
5.12

Std. Dev.
7.88
4.94

Min.
18
0

Max.
75
17

Obs.
4224
4224

Table 1.4 Household Summary Statistics
Household Characteristics
Proportion Rural
Proportion with Female Heads
Wealth Index (1-5 scale)

Table 1.5 Husband Summary Statistics
Husbands' Characteristics
Age (yrs)
Education (yrs)
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For all models: Robust standard errors in brackets; * significant at 10%;
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; Models include child's birth order.
Table 2 OLS Regression Results
Height to Age Z-Score
Participates in Decisions re.
Child Health Care
Participates in Decisions re.
Large Purchases
Participates in Decisions re.
Daily Needs
Female Child
Mother's
Age
Mother's Years of
Education
Educ*Age
Interaction
Mother's BMI

Model 1
0
[0.046]
0.118
[0.043]***
0.078
[0.046]*
-0.085
[0.034]**
-0.001
[0.006]
0.091
[0.020]***
-0.001
[0.001]
0.055
[0.006]***

Mother in Microfinance
Mother Working

Model 2
0.002
[0.046]
0.116
[0.043]***
0.07
[0.046]
-0.084
[0.034]**
-0.001
[0.006]
0.09
[0.020]***
-0.001
[0.001]
0.054
[0.006]***
-0.138
[0.039]***
0.001
[0.040]

Model 3
0.007
[0.046]
0.114
[0.043]***
0.073
[0.045]
-0.079
[0.034]**
-0.005
[0.006]
0.082
[0.020]***
-0.001
[0.001]*
0.041
[0.006]***
-0.11
[0.039]***
0.02
[0.041]
0.047
[0.064]
-0.055
[0.041]
-0.407
[0.069]***
-0.319
[0.063]***
-0.246
[0.062]***
-0.23
[0.055]***

5169
0.09

5169
0.1

Female Head
of Household
Rural
1st Wealth
Quintile
2nd Wealth
Quintile
3rd Wealth
Quintile
4th Wealth
Quintile
Husband's
Age
Husband's Years of
Education
Observations
R-squared
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5169
0.09

Model 4
0.014
[0.046]
0.118
[0.043]***
0.067
[0.045]
-0.077
[0.034]**
-0.009
[0.007]
0.073
[0.020]***
-0.002
[0.001]**
0.039
[0.006]***
-0.101
[0.039]**
0.025
[0.040]
0.039
[0.064]
-0.063
[0.041]
-0.313
[0.071]***
-0.233
[0.065]***
-0.185
[0.062]***
-0.19
[0.055]***
0.003
[0.004]
0.028
[0.005]***
5169
0.11
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Table 3 Interaction Regression Results
Height to Age Z-Score
Participates in Decisions
re. Child Health Care
Participates in Decisions
re. Large Purchases
Participates in Decisions
re. Daily Needs
Large Purchases
Interaction
Female Child
Mother's
Age
Mother's Years of
Education
Educ*Age
Interaction
Mother's BMI
Mother in Microfinance
Mother Working
Female Head
of Household
Rural
1st Wealth
Quintile
2nd Wealth
Quintile
3rd Wealth
Quintile
4th Wealth
Quintile
Partner's
Age
Partner's Years of
Education

Base Model
0.014
[0.046]
0.118
[0.043]***
0.067
[0.045]

-0.077
[0.034]**
-0.009
[0.007]
0.073
[0.020]***
-0.002
[0.001]**
0.039
[0.006]***
-0.101
[0.039]**
0.025
[0.040]
0.039
[0.064]
-0.063
[0.041]
-0.313
[0.071]***
-0.233
[0.065]***
-0.185
[0.062]***
-0.19
[0.055]***
0.003
[0.004]
0.028
[0.005]***

Infant
Observations
R-squared

https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol9/iss1/4

5169
0.11

Infant
Interactions
0.002
[0.043]
0.121
[0.044]**
0.057
[0.043]
0.082
[0.101]
-0.079
[0.032]**
0.004
[0.006]
0.061
[0.020]***
-0.001
[0.001]*
0.038
[0.006]***
-0.053
[0.038]
0.049
[0.039]
-0.001
[0.061]
-0.056
[0.039]
-0.311
[0.068]***
-0.255
[0.062]***
-0.18
[0.060]***
-0.184
[0.053]***
0.007
[0.003]*
0.025
[0.005]***
0.904
[0.061]***
5169
0.18

Female
Interactions
0.013
[0.046]
0.065
[0.053]
0.066
[0.045]
0.106
[0.069]
-0.141
[0.054]**
-0.009
[0.007]
0.073
[0.020]***
-0.002
[0.001]**
0.039
[0.006]***
-0.101
[0.039]**
0.025
[0.040]
0.036
[0.064]
-0.065
[0.041]
-0.312
[0.071]***
-0.233
[0.065]***
-0.186
[0.062]***
-0.190
[0.055]***
0.003
[0.004]
0.027
[0.005]***

Rural
Interactions
0.014
[0.045]
0.080
[0.062]
-0.068
[0.0454]
0.058
[0.072]
-0.077
[0.034]**
-0.009
[0.007]
0.073
[0.020]***
-0.002
[0.001]**
0.039
[0.006]***
-0.100
[0.039]**
0.024
[0.041]
0.038
[0.064]
-0.066
[0.080]
-0.312
[0.071]***
-0.231
[0.065]***
-0.184
[0.062]***
-0.186
[0.055]***
0.003
[0.004]
0.028
[0.005]***

5169
0.11

5169
0.11
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Table 4 Fixed Effects Results
Height to Age Z-Score
Participates in Decisions re.
Child Health Care
Participates in Decisions re.
Large Purchases
Participates in Decisions re.
Daily Needs
Female Child
Mother's Age
Mother's Years of
Education
Educ*Age
Interaction
Mother's BMI
Mother in Microfinance
Mother Working
Female Head
of Household
Rural
1st Wealth
Quintile
2nd Wealth
Quintile
3rd Wealth
Quintile
4th Wealth
Quintile
Father's
Age
Father's Years of
Education
Observations
Number of Groups
R-squared
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Base Model Fixed Effects Model
0.014
0.318
[0.046]
[0.203]*
0.029
0.118
[0.043]***
[0.223]
0.067
0.076
[0.045]
[0.192]
-0.077
-0.014
[0.034]**
[0.070]
-0.100
-0.009
[0.007]
[0.027]***
0.029
0.073
[0.020]***
[0.083]
0.001
-0.002
[0.001]**
[0.003]
0.039
0.106
[0.006]***
[0.023]***
-0.101
-0.108
[0.039]**
[0.237]
0.025
0.202
[0.040]
[0.292]
(dropped)
0.039
[0.064]
(dropped)
-0.063
[0.041]
-0.313
(dropped)
[0.071]***
-0.233
(dropped)
[0.065]***
-0.185
(dropped)
[0.062]***
(dropped)
-0.19
[0.055]***
0.01
0.003
[0.004]
[0.014]
0.028
0.007
[0.005]***
[0.023]
5169
5169
4145
0.11
0.11
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